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1 Introduction
The process of translational biomedical innovation is becoming increasingly complex, ex-
pensive, and uncertain. This implies that the traditional financing vehicles of private and
public equity will become less effective for funding biopharma in the future, as the needs,
expectations, and risk profiles of limited partners and shareholders increasingly diverge from
the new realities of biomedical innovation.
In this paper, we describe a specific legal structure, the business development company
(BDC), that can be used to raise money in the public equity and debt markets to facilitate
investing in biomedical innovation, especially early-stage translational medical projects. A
BDC is a type of closed-end investment fund that can partake of certain relaxed requirements
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Investment Company Act”), so long as
it makes at least 70% of its investments in certain “eligible” portfolio companies. A BDC
can elect to be treated as a Regulated Investment Company (RIC), under the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 (the “Code”), and thus not be required to pay U.S. federal corporate-
level income taxes on income and net capital gains that it distributes to its shareholders
as dividends on a timely basis. The BDC, used as a structure to make investments in
multiple companies formed to commercialize biomedical innovation, would allow investors
the opportunity to spread risk among a number of different drug trials, and thus increase
the chances of participating in the long-term growth of a successful drug, along the lines of
the “megafund” proposed by Fernandez, Stein, and Lo (2012).
For the purpose of this paper, we distinguish BDCs formed to make equity investments,
which we refer to as venture capital BDCs (VC-BDCs), from BDCs whose primary purpose
is to make debt investments, which we refer to as debt-BDCs. This distinction is important
for successful fundraising and trading, since the market recognizes that debt-BDCs and
VC-BDCs have different risks and rewards, especially over the short term. VC-BDCs are
best suited for long-term investors who seek to benefit from the returns associated with
biomedical innovation, and therefore may be particularly attractive to: (i) investors with
medical expertise who can appreciate the risks of going through the FDIC process, (ii)
“banking entities,” which recently were generally prohibited from investing in hedge funds
and private equity funds by the Volcker Rule,1 but who are permitted to invest, subject to
1 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §619, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (“Dodd-Frank” or the “Act”); Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §1851 (2014); and
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certain restrictions, in BDCs, and (iii) retail investors, who have traditionally only had been
able to invest in large pharmaceutical companies to gain exposure to similar assets.
We begin in Section 2 with a discussion of the recent challenges in the biopharma industry
that highlight the need for new funding vehicles the BDC. We present a brief review of the
history of BDCs and their basic structure 3, and then describe VC-BDCs in Section 4. In
Section 5, we describe the organizational structure of a typical BDC, and in Section 6 we
turn to the basic mechanics of operating a BDC. Some of the practical advantages and
disadvantages of the BDC structure are presented in Section 7, and we conclude in Section
8. More detailed legal and regulatory aspects of BDCs are provided in the Appendix.
2 Motivation
The life sciences sector is becoming increasingly paradoxical for researchers and investors
alike. At the same time that scientific breakthroughs like gene sequencing and precision
medicine are unraveling diseases that have confounded conventional medicine for centuries,
capital flows have slowed to a trickle at the early stages of commercialization in biomedicine,
making it increasingly difficult and risky to translate basic research findings into new clinical
applications (Sweeney, 2013). Industry professionals have termed this capital shortage the
“Valley of Death.”
While seed-stage biomedical research may be occurring at the bench, it is not being
translated as effectively into clinical applications at the bedside. The process of the bench-
to-bedside enterprise, of harnessing knowledge from the basic sciences to produce new drugs,
devices, and treatment options for patients, is known as “translational research,” the interface
between basic science and clinical medicine, and it is of the utmost importance for successful
biopharma innovation (Woolf, 2008). The primary objective of translational research is to
arrive at a commercial bedside application, often in the form of a New Molecular Entity
(NME) or a Biologics License Application (BLA), although the research can also entail the
development of unanticipated or “non-derivative” products. However, the importance of this
step also means translational research is a bottleneck for future development.
For example, early-stage research is the primary source of valuable “First-in-Class” NMEs
and BLAs, First-in-Class meaning drugs that use a new and unique mechanism of action
Proprietary Trading & Certain Interests In and Relationships With Covered Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 31 (Jan.
31, 2014).
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for treating a medical condition (FDA, 2014). These innovations serve previously unmet
medical needs, or otherwise significantly help to advance patient care and public health.
Unfortunately, in recent years the number of medicines approved by regulatory bodies around
the world has declined, whether First-in-Class or variations on a preexisting theme. In the
past decade, half as many NMEs were approved compared to preceding years (FDA, 2014).
In 2007, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) only approved 19 NMEs and BLAs,
the fewest number since 1983 (Paul et al., 2010). Of the 27 new drugs granted FDA approval
in 2013, only 33% were identified as First-in-Class (FDA, 2014). Moreover, the number of
new NMEs and BLAs has also sharply declined per dollar of investment.
Without a drastic improvement in the current model for translational research, the life
sciences sector cannot sustain sufficient innovation to replace the loss of revenues due to
patent expirations for successful products (Paul et al., 2010). Only $6 billion was spent on
translational efforts in 2012, while $48 billion was spent on basic research and $125 billion
on clinical development in the life sciences sector (Milken Institute, 2012).
One of the main challenges to biomedical innovation is the fact that the multi-stage
process of drug development is too lengthy, risky, and expensive for any single investor to
undertake from beginning to end. In contrast to the standard analogy of drug development
as a marathon, a more apt analogy given current costs and complexities is a triathlon.
Figure 1 depicts the different stages of a typical drug development program, and shows
that the distinct risk/reward characteristics of each stage implies distinct investors drawn
to the corresponding investment profiles. Early-stage research is much more difficult to
finance with traditional sources of capital (Fernandez, Stein, and Lo, 2012). Innovative
firms cannot secure capital for a host of reasons: investment returns are uncertain, they
have little collateral to secure debt, and their capital is difficult to redeploy, since it mostly
takes the form of intangible assets (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Hall, 2002). On average,
commercializing one drug takes 14 years and $1.3 billion, and for each success, there are 50
failures (WSJ, 2012). This risk profile is unpalatable to many investors.
Early-stage research companies cannot secure capital from public equity markets as easily
as large pharmaceutical companies. In the early stages of drug development, it is impossible
to establish future trajectories of sales and profits (Sweeney, 2013). An established company
with current earnings and profits is in a much stronger position to sell equity shares than an
early-stage company which has yet to demonstrate its potential for upside. At the same time,
3
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Figure 1: Relationship between the stages of drug discovery, their financial characteristics,
the natural investors for each stage, and the most appropriate financing method. Earlier-
stage assets are more risky; hence their financing vehicles naturally reflect investors with
those risk preferences. Source: Lo and Naraharisetti (2014).
traditional financial intermediaries are not viable alternatives either. Banks strongly prefer
to make decisions based on financial accounting ratios, rather than future expected cash flows
determined by innovative but highly speculative activity. Loans to early-stage companies,
made against personal guarantees and liquid assets, often require collateral exceeding their
value threefold. The risk appetite of traditional financial intermediaries is diametrically
opposed to the intangible and high-risk/high-reward nature of investment in early-stage,
preclinical biotechnology (Sweeney, 2013).
What are the current sources of capital for early-stage research? The answer is surpris-
ing. Most early-stage biomedical research occurs within public institutions. In particular,
universities produce approximately two-thirds of early-stage research (Heller and Eisenberg,
1998). However, these institutions often struggle inordinately to commercialize their discov-
eries (Sweeney, 2013). Public institutions possess limited competence in fast-paced, market-
oriented bargaining, and limited resources for absorbing transaction costs, e.g., for patenting
and licensing (Thursby, Jensen, and Thursby, 2000).
A public institution’s interest to the public stands in contrast to the statutory duty
imposed on the directors of a corporation to act in the best interests of its shareholders by
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maximizing financial return.2 For example, a politically accountable government agency such
as the National Institutes for Health (NIH) may further its public health agenda by leveraging
its intellectual property (IP) rights to ensure widespread availability of new therapeutic
products at reasonable prices. This may serve a laudable social goal, but it also lowers the
potential financial returns, creating a vicious cycle that deters further private investment.
When the NIH sought to establish co-ownership of IP rights held by Burroughs-Wellcome
on the use of azidothymidine (AZT) to treat the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), its
purpose was to lower the price of AZT, and to promote public health.3 In contrast, a private-
sector firm is more likely to use its IP to maintain a lucrative product monopoly, which can
reward shareholders and fund future product development (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998).
Thanks to the many recent breakthroughs in biomedicine, the amount of innovative
biomedical research currently exceeds the available capital flow for translation into commer-
cialized products (Fernandez, Stein, and Lo, 2012). This persistent deficit in investment
mandates a more comprehensive solution than public funding alone—it is clear that the life
sciences sector needs new financial approaches to early-stage drug development and other
forms of biomedical innovation. If the current stagnancy in healthcare is to be overcome,
greater private investment into biomedical research must be deployed—but deployed care-
fully, in a manner conducive to both upstream innovation and downstream product develop-
ment and commercialization. Financial incentives can mobilize a broader set of stakeholders
and a more expansive pool of assets, initiating a virtuous cycle of investor confidence that
magnifies the likelihood of success. What is needed right now are models that break down
the value chain to offer an acceptable return on investment (ROI) through each stage of
research and development, effectively spreading the investment risk and reward throughout
the entire R&D process.
The key to overcoming the barriers to capital flow posed by traditional sources of financing
lies in the establishment of novel structures capable of appropriately and successfully tapping
into capital markets. One such innovative structure is the “operating company,” which has
been used by several businesses seeking to invest in biomedical innovation, such as Safeguard
Scientifics and Arrowhead Research. An operating company refers to a corporate entity that
has been formed primarily to perform all of the activities, and assume all of the accompanying
2See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1993).
3See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc. 40 F.3d 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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risks, of a business.
However, an operating company is not ideal for risky, early-stage investment in biomed-
ical research for reasons best illustrated through an example of a hypothetical investment
in early-stage research on clinical cancer compounds, where the estimated success rate is
very low (DiMasi et al., 2013; Retzios, 2009; Pavlou and Reichert, 2010; Kola and Landis,
2004). For financing early-stage cancer research, the use of an operating company to limit
risk exposure and liability is legally possible only if the operating company is not inadver-
tently operating as an investment company. The Investment Company Act of 1940 regulates
investment companies registered under the act whose shares are offered to the public, such as
mutual funds. However, the Investment Company Act defines an investment company very
broadly, as any issuer that is, or holds itself out as being, primarily engaged in the business
of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities. Under the Investment Company Act, a
company may be deemed to be an investment company if it owns, or proposes to acquire,
investment securities with a value exceeding 40% of the value of its total assets (excluding
government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis, unless an exemption or
safe harbor applies. As a result, operating companies can become “inadvertent” investment
companies, especially if they invest in securities and conduct significant operations through
subsidiaries that are not majority-owned (Glicksman and Callaway, 2014).
To avoid registration under the Investment Company Act, an operating company needs
to fund projects through majority-owned subsidiaries, held for the long term. For companies
such as Safeguard Scientific, which access the capital markets through an operating company
to invest in healthcare companies that have “lesser regulatory risk and have achieved or are
near commercialization,” this is an acceptable tradeoff.4 However, this structure is simply
not conducive to companies developing cancer drugs in the FDA approval process, where,
due to the binary outcome of the trials, a security will need to be monetized immediately
after the completion of a successful drug trial, or disposed of if negative results ensue.
Additionally, the use of the operating company model for investing in multiple operating
subsidiaries requires that the operating company take a controlling interest in each port-
folio company. In the case of funding research with high failure rates, like clinical cancer
compounds, taking a controlling interest in each portfolio company is not feasible. If the
4See Safeguard Scientific Annual Report on Form 10-K for Fiscal Year ended Dec. 31, 2013 (File No.
001-0562) filed March 7, 2014.
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investing company owns a controlling interest, the investing company will have greater ex-
posure to risk due to higher ownership levels in the business activities conducted by the
portfolio company.
Other investment company structures have been used to finance biopharma research,
such as the traditional registered closed-end fund, an investment company registered under
the Investment Company Act that is not freely redeemable, which typically trades on a stock
exchange. But a registered closed-end fund is more often used for investing in later-stage,
publicly traded biopharma companies, generally missing the private and small-cap companies
involved in early-stage research. Registered closed-end funds have also recently been used
for making healthcare investments in publicly traded companies,5 private companies, foreign
securities, and private investment in public equities (“PIPE”) transactions.6 However, none
of these vehicles offer the same degree of flexibility as the BDC.
3 A Brief History of the BDC
In the 1970s, Congress was pressured by a perceived crisis in the capital markets to provide
exemptions from the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Tashjian, 1980; Boehm et al. 2004).
Private equity and venture capital firms believed their capacity to provide financing to small
businesses was blocked by a limitation in the Investment Company Act, which prevented these
firms from becoming public companies without becoming registered management investment
companies. It was argued that innovation was being stifled because registered management
investment companies would be subject to the full regulation of the statute, compliance with
which would be unduly difficult (BDC Reporter, 2015). These considerations led Congress
to enact the Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980 (Boehm et al., 2004), which,
among other things, amended the Investment Company Act (the “1980 Amendments”).7
This legislation was the result of discussions between Congress, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and the venture capital industry, with the common goal of removing
5See, for example, Tekla Capital Management LLC Registration Statement, available at http://www.
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1604522/000110465914054511/0001104659-14-054511-index.htm; and
BlackRock Science and Technology Trust, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1616678/000119312514351997/d791791dn2a.htm.
6See, for example, Annual Report on Form N-CSR for Tekla Healthcare Investors (HI) for the year ended
September 30, 2014; and Annual Report on Form N-CSR for Tekla Life Science Investors for the year ended
September 30, 2014.
7See Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980. Pub. L. No 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (1980).
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burdens on venture capital activities while maintaining investor protections.
The 1980 Amendments led to the creation of the BDC, a new form of closed-end in-
vestment fund, in order to facilitate the flow of capital to companies that were perceived as
less capable of availing themselves of conventional forms of financing. The legislation also
lessened several of the restrictions under the Investment Company Act to encourage partici-
pation in the regulated portion of the asset management industry, and created an incentive
for funds to become BDCs.
Legislators believed that establishing BDCs would lead to the creation of a number of
public vehicles that would invest in private equity, and thus increase the flow of capital to
small, growing businesses. In the initial years following the 1980 Amendments, a number of
BDCs were formed, including Merrill Lynch Venture Capital Inc. (1981), American Capital
Ltd. (1986), and Capital Southwest (1988) (Bristow and Petillon, 1999). After their initial
appeal in the 1980s, however, the popularity of BDCs declined in the following decade.
BDCs made their way back into the financial mainstream in the 2000s (Smith, 2014). The
increasing demand for capital by small and middle market companies, particularly because
of increased regulation of banks stemming from the 2008 financial crisis and the demand by
the public to provide such capital, has resulted in a new growth of the BDC. As a result,
BDCs are emerging as a realistic alternative for mainstream investors with an appetite for
investments in early-stage research. In harnessing an entirely new sector of the investment
community, the BDC provides a new way of funneling capital to biomedical innovation.
More formally, a BDC is a type of closed-end fund that benefits from certain relaxed
regulatory requirements under the Investment Company Act in exchange for a requirement
that the BDC will make 70% of its investments in “eligible portfolio companies.” While
Section 2(a)(48) of the Investment Company Act enumerates several categories of qualifying
assets, most BDCs own securities that qualify because they have been issued by an eligible
portfolio company. An eligible portfolio company must be organized and have its principal
place of business in the United States, and encompasses all private U.S. companies, as well
as public U.S. companies with an equity market capitalization of up to $250 million. A BDC
is also obliged to “make available significant managerial assistance” to those companies.
BDCs can be structured with internal management, like an operating company, or with
external management, like a private venture capital firm. They are typically publicly traded
on a national stock exchange, but they can also be non-traded. If certain requirements are
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met, BDCs may qualify to elect to be taxed as “regulated investment companies,” or RICs,
for federal tax purposes. The process is designed to avoid double taxation, whereby both
the company and individual investors would be taxed. This qualification permits them to
eliminate taxes on capital gains and income earned on the BDC’s investments at the BDC
level.
BDCs provide mainstream investors access to investments in private company investments
historically only available to institutional investors or wealthy individuals through private
funds. In contrast to many other forms of investment companies, a BDC is unique in that it
provides shareholders with the ability to retain the liquidity of a publicly traded stock, while
sharing in the benefits of investing in emerging-growth or expansion-stage privately owned
companies. In this way, it can be structured similarly to a publicly held private equity or
venture capital fund.
BDCs are exempted from some provisions of the Investment Company Act, and certain
sections apply only to BDCs. These exemptions and provisions may make BDCs preferable
for making investments in private companies compared to other types of closed-end funds
registered under the Investment Company Act. For example, pursuant to Section 205(b)(3) of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”), investment advisers
to BDCs are permitted to charge an incentive fee based on capital gains. However, registered
closed-end funds are prohibited from doing so. Registered closed-end funds that trade on
a stock exchange strike a net asset value (NAV) daily. BDCs are only required to value
their assets on a quarterly basis, which is more congruent with valuing illiquid privately held
securities.
4 The VC-BDC and Translational Medicine
Our proposal is to create one or more financing entities, in the form of a VC-BDC, to
invest in multiple biomedical projects throughout various stages of their development cycles,
financed in the public markets. When sources of private capital are sufficient, reliance on
public investors is unnecessary, but this is clearly not the case for biomedical research.
Increasingly, venture capital firms are demonstrating interest in attracting public investors,
who are interested in the upside of start-up and pre-IPO companies. Such investments are
coming to be seen as important, and perhaps even necessary, components of a properly
diversified investment portfolio (Boehm and Krus, 2001). Tapping the public markets to
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expand the pool of capital available for life science investment by bringing together investors
is a viable option.
A BDC is superior to an operating company structure in reducing risk to an investor.
An operating company can serve to limit liability, but it does so only in relation to one
such business structure at a time. A BDC, however, affords an even greater degree of risk
reduction. Multiple speculative investments require a much broader set of assets in order to
achieve risk reduction, but this is precisely what a BDC is designed to do. By using a BDC
to invest in multiple biomedical portfolio companies, the investor is granted an opportunity
to spread risk among a number of different drug trials, thus increasing the investor’s chances
of participating in the long-term growth of a successful drug.
A BDC must invest at least 70% of its assets in U.S. companies that are either private, or
publicly traded with a market capitalization of $250 million or less. This regulatory require-
ment splits the investment universe into two broad groups. Traditional closed-end funds
are generally favored over a BDC for investments in larger companies and/or foreign invest-
ments. For making investments in biomedical innovation in early-stage, private companies,
the BDC is the superior option.
The BDC facilitates investment in early-stage biomedical innovation by providing direct
access to public equity and debt markets. Although investments in BDCs can take the form
of equity or debt investments, almost all new BDCs have chosen a debt-investment focus.
The VC-BDC is now a comparative rarity among today’s BDCs.
Nevertheless, we believe the VC-BDC model—with its capacity for providing both perma-
nent capital and managerial assistance—can more fully realize the original intent of the BDC,
and allow institutions which conduct early-stage research to gain access to inputs which were
previously inaccessible. Given the long-term nature of investments in the biopharma indus-
try and its inherent regulatory hurdles, the mandate to provide managerial assistance may
help a VC-BDC to maximize the value of its investments in a portfolio company (Markovich,
2012). For example, a VC-BDC can generate considerably greater resources for negotiating
licenses on a case-by-case basis than can public sector institutions or small start-up firms,
and can provide the knowledge required to make those steps with appropriate measures for
mitigating risk and improving the ultimate commercial viability of any arising discoveries.
We propose that this vehicle will be capable of bridging the translational research gap, and
meeting a more diverse range of risk profiles in the investment community.
10
The VC-BDC has the potential to play a major role as a unique alternative to traditional
financing, acting in synergy with the existing biotech venture capital industry to stimulate
innovation. A natural business model follows from the binary nature of biomedical companies
and the operating costs of a publicly traded, heavily regulated vehicle such as a BDC, in
which an asset manager funds multiple biomedical start-up companies, thus distributing the
costs (and risks) of multiple projects, with the objective of allowing gains from successful
biomedical investments to compensate for companies which fail to survive the translational
research process.
5 Organizational Structure of the BDC
A BDC regulated under the Investment Company Act must be organized and have its prin-
cipal place of business in the United States, and must be operated for the purpose of making
investments in the types of securities enumerated in the Investment Company Act. For a
fuller description of qualifying securities and a BDC’s legislatively required offer of manage-
rial assistance toward the issuing firms, see the appropriate sections of the Appendix.
BDCs can be externally managed or internally managed. An externally managed BDC
typically has no employees, and has an external investment adviser (a separate legal entity)
to manage the BDC under the direction of the board of directors. An internally managed
BDC has no external investment adviser, and the BDC is managed by its officers, which are
typically its employees, under the direction of the board of directors.
BDCs are permitted greater flexibility regarding leverage, compensation, affiliated trans-
actions, and restrictions for selling shares below NAV than registered closed-end funds (see
Section 5 for details).
Leverage
BDCs are less restricted than registered closed-end investment companies as to the amount
of debt they can have outstanding. A BDC is permitted, under specified conditions, to issue
multiple classes of indebtedness and one class of stock senior to its common stock, if its
asset coverage ratio, as defined in the Investment Company Act, is at least equal to 200%
immediately after each such issuance, which means that any debt or senior securities cannot
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exceed 1/3 of the BDC’s total assets.8 For example, for each $1.00 of senior securities (debt
and preferred stock) issued, the BDC must have $2.00 of assets at issuance. In comparison,
registered closed-end funds are limited to issuing leverage at least equal to 300% immediately
after each issuance—for each $1.00 of debt issued, a registered closed-end fund must have
$3.00 of assets at issuance.9
A leveraged strategy of using indebtedness to expand their assets in investments is often
an attractive provision for debt-BDCs. However, because of the risky nature of early-stage
investments in biomedical innovation, VC-BDCs may determine not to use leverage to the
same extent as their debt-BDC peers.
In addition, with respect to certain types of senior securities, the BDC must make pro-
visions to prohibit any dividend distribution to shareholders or the repurchase of certain
securities, unless they meet the applicable asset coverage ratios at the time of the dividend
distribution or repurchase. A BDC may also borrow amounts up to 5% of the value of their
total assets for temporary purposes.
Incentive Compensation
Managers of closed-end funds are generally prohibited from receiving incentive compensation
on the basis of capital gains, and are prohibited from having employee profit sharing plans.
However, these restrictions have been relaxed under the 1980 Amendments for BDCs.
Section 205(b)(3) of the Advisers Act permits external investment advisers of BDCs to
assess an incentive performance fee of up to 20% on a BDC’s realized capital gains, net of all
realized capital losses and unrealized capital depreciation over a specified period, typically
annually. Like registered closed-end funds, a BDC may also charge a base management fee,
which is typically determined by taking the average value of a BDC’s gross assets, usually
calculated at an annual rate of between 1.50% to 2.00%, paid quarterly in arrears, and an
incentive fee based on income, including interest income, dividend income, and any other
income, which is also typically paid quarterly. The income incentive fee is typically calculated
as the pre-base management fee net investment income for the quarter as a percentage of
average assets managed, and the return is compared against a pre-determined hurdle rate
(usually 2% a quarter or 8% annually).
8Lemke, Lins, Regulation of Investment Companies §12:06 (October 2014).
9See http://www.ici.org/faqs/faq/faqs_closed_end\#ii.
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Internally managed BDCs are permitted to pay incentive compensation either through
a profit sharing plan or a stock option plan. Section 57(n) of the Investment Company Act
permits an internally managed BDC to operate a profit sharing plan for directors, officers,
and general partners, so long as the aggregate amount of profits distributed under such a plan
does not exceed 20% of the BDC’s net income after taxes in any fiscal year. Participation
in the profit sharing plan by a BDC’s directors or its general partners is permitted only by
an order of the SEC.
Internally managed BDCs that do not operate a profit sharing plan are permitted to
issue stock options to their directors, officers, employees, and general partners. Many BDCs
have also obtained orders from the SEC permitting them to issue shares of restricted stock
to their directors, officers, employees, and general partners.10
Internally managed BDCs may have different forms of compensation to attract and re-
tain personnel, in addition to the incentive compensation. The varieties of compensation
arrangements differ by company and include salaries, bonus arrangements, 401(k) plans,
and deferred compensation plans.
Affiliated Transactions
Registered investment companies are prohibited from entering into transactions with their
affiliates under Section 17 of the Investment Company Act. However, Section 57, the analo-
gous section for BDCs, is slightly less onerous than its counterpart. Section 57 addresses the
ability of BDCs to engage in certain types of transactions with affiliates. A BDC may not en-
gage in specified transactions with its affiliates (directors, officers, investment adviser, their
designated affiliates, and anyone controlling, controlled by, or under common control with
the BDC). Depending on the nature of the affiliation with the BDC, transactions involving
a BDC and one or more of its affiliates require either:
• Authorization by the “required majority” of the board of directors, which consists of
a majority of the board, including a majority of disinterested board members and a
majority of the board with no financial interest in the transaction; or
10See Harris & Harris Group, Inc., Investment Company Act Release 30027 (April 2012); Hercules Tech-
nology Growth Capital, Inc., Investment Company Act Release No. 29303 (June 2010) ; MCG Capital
Corporation, Investment Company Act Release 29210 (April 2010); Main Street Capital Corporation, In-
vestment Company Act Release No. 28768 (June 16, 2009); see also Triangle Capital Corporation, Investment
Company Act Release No. 28718 (May 5, 2009).
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• An order of the SEC.
Many BDCs have obtained exemptions from the SEC, permitting certain co-investments
with affiliated funds, subject to certain conditions.11
NAV Determination
Traditional registered closed-end funds, which generally invest their assets in liquid invest-
ments, must value their assets on a daily basis. In contrast, BDC assets must be valued on a
quarterly basis, in connection with the issuance of their financial statements. All investment
companies regulated under the Investment Company Act, including BDCs, are required to
account for their investment portfolio at value. Value is defined as the market value of se-
curities for which market quotations are readily available. For other securities and assets,
value is defined as the fair value determined in good faith by the board of directors.
Because BDCs primarily invest in illiquid securities of private companies, they are only
required to value their assets quarterly, as it would be difficult to value their assets daily as
traditional registered closed-end funds are required to do.
The Financial Accounting Standards Board’s statement ASC 820 (formerly FAS 157)
requires that public companies’ financial instruments generally be valued at their current
market price, that is to say, “marked to market.” Each debt and equity security is separately
valued.
There is no single standard for determining fair value in good faith. Determining fair
value requires that judgment be applied to the specific facts and circumstances of each
portfolio investment, while employing a consistently applied valuation process. Accordingly,
valuation of privately held, illiquid securities is a time-consuming, judgment-based process,
involving copious amounts of documentation to substantiate any claims.
Valuation has important implications for issuing new shares: Section 63(2) of the In-
vestment Company Act provides that, with the exception of an IPO, a BDC may not sell
common stock at a price below NAV, after excluding selling commissions and discounts,
unless a majority of its shareholders that are not affiliated persons of such BDC have ap-
proved such company’s policy and practice of making such sales at its last annual meeting
11See, for example, Garrison Capital Inc., et al., Investment Company Act Release No. 31409 (January 12,
2015); TPG Specialty Lending, Inc., et al., Investment Company Release No. 31379 (December 16, 2014);
Monroe Capital Corporation, et al., Investment Company Release No. 31286 (October 15, 2014).
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of shareholders within one year of the sale of securities.
6 Managing a BDC
In this section we address several issues regarding the management of a BDC, including
compliance and reporting, fundraising, portfolio management, and cash management. We
also highlight the key differences between a VC-BDC and the more common debt-BDC, and
provide a comparison of the benefits and drawbacks of VC-BDCs for asset managers wishing
to use the BDC structure to fund biomedical research. For a fuller description of establishing
the BDC as a RIC for tax purposes, and a comparison of debt versus venture capital BDCs,
see the Appendix.
Compliance and Reporting
BDCs are generally subject to the same reporting obligations of traditional public companies
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), and must file an annual
report Form 10-K, quarterly reports on Form 10-Q, and all other forms, such as proxy
statements and current reports on Form 8-K. If the BDC is listed on a national exchange,
it must also comply with the requirements of the exchange. BDCs are also subject to
compliance with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which requires management
to document and test internal controls, among other things, and for auditors to test and
report on those controls.
(Note: unlike registered closed-end funds that file N-CSRs and N-SARs, BDCs file their
annual and quarterly reports on Forms 10-K and 10-Q.)
There are several important considerations for private funds that are deliberating regu-
lation as a BDC. BDCs are required to make certain public disclosures of portfolio company
information. When preparing their publicly filed financial statements, and/or registration
statements, which are filed on Form N-2, BDCs must include: (1) value and cost of each
portfolio company investment; and (2) for certain portfolio companies in which the BDC has
a controlling interest, the BDC may be required to disclose certain financial information of
the portfolio company, either in its audited financial statements or in the notes to the finan-
cial statements, subject to certain tests required by Rules 3-09 and 4-08(g) of Regulation
S-X.
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Fundraising for a Biomedical BDC
Entrepreneurs seeking to raise funds for specific biomedical research should consult with
investment bankers in the investment space to determine the best method for building a
portfolio in connection with a public offering. However, some basic background is considered
here.
Historically, asset managers with a successful track record could raise capital based on
a plan to make investments in eligible portfolio companies. This practice is sometimes
known as a “blind pool.” However, the tightening of the credit markets in the wake of the
financial crisis appears to have foreclosed the blind pool option for BDC IPOs. The market
now requires that even successful asset managers have a portfolio of investments prior to
completing an IPO (Talcott and Kerns, 2014).
However, this is not necessarily a bad thing for a biomedical VC-BDC. Steadily raising
capital over time mitigates the challenges associated with deploying capital in a blind pool
IPO, because management is able to deploy capital strategically as it is raised, rather than
needing to find investable assets for the entire fund over a short time period.
Partly due to the challenging environment for blind pool IPOs, there has been a prolifer-
ation of non-traded BDCs over the last several years. While non-traded BDCs share certain
features with traded BDCs, they are different in significant ways. Traded BDC shares are
liquid, while a non-traded BDC’s shares are not traded on an exchange, and have limited
liquidity (Investment Program Association, 2013).
Offerings of non-traded BDC shares are only available to investors who meet suitability
standards established by the state where they live in order to participate in these offerings.
(Investment Program Association, 2013) They are typically sold over an extended offering
period through broker-dealers and financial advisors, rather than in a one-time IPO. The
up-front fees of a non-traded BDC may be in the range of 11.5% to 15%.
Historically, the number of BDC offerings has been limited. Over the last decade, the
number of BDC offerings annually has ranged between zero and six. In 2012, 2013, and
2014, there were five, four, and five IPOs respectively. The number of IPOs by BDCs in
the pipeline is unclear, since the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act enables
prospective issuers to confidentially file their registration statements and publicly announce
their intentions late in the registration process.
Selling shares to retail investors can be attractive to issuers since institutions tend to
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demand lower prices during an offering. According to the Capital IQ information service,
retail investors have been between 14% to 66% of an IPO for recent debt-BDC offerings,
and 57% to 78% of an IPO for the two most recent VC-BDCs, Firsthand Technology Value
Fund (2011) and GSV Capital (2011). Asset managers seeking to raise capital in the public
markets through an IPO should consult with investment bankers to determine the process,
timing, and viability for the offering.
Investment Portfolio Management
A key feature of a biomedical BDC is the ability to invest in a portfolio of assets, where
“assets” are defined more broadly than for a traditional biotech VC that focuses exclusively
on acquiring equity or convertible preferred interest in an entrepreneur’s startup. In addition
to these investments, a BDC could also acquire royalty interests in patents, approved drugs,
or even early-stage research that has not yet filed for patent protection, but for which there
are IP rights agreements between the BDC and the owner of the IP rights (see the Appendix
for further discussion of patents and BDCs).12
One of the main benefits of a portfolio of assets is, if the assets are chosen carefully,
the portfolio can offer investors a more attractive risk/reward profile because of the benefits
of financial diversification (Fernandez, Stein, and Lo, 2012). As long as the assets’ returns
are not perfectly correlated, combining multiple assets into a portfolio can help reduce the
volatility of individual investments. The amount of volatility reduction is inversely related to
the pairwise correlations among the assets’ returns. Consider a simple example of a portfolio
of n assets, each with identical expected return µ and return volatility σ. Assume that
the pairwise return correlation between any two assets is identical and equal to ρ (where
− 1
n−1
≤ ρ ≤ 1). Then an equally weighted portfolio of these n assets will have expected
return µ and volatility σp = σ
2
[
1
n
+ n−1
n
ρ
]
. This relation shows that, as the number of assets
n increases, the portfolio volatility σp declines monotonically towards its asymptotic limit ρ.
Figure 2 illustrates this diversification pattern as a function of the number of assets for
various levels of correlation. For assets that have uncorrelated returns, portfolio volatility
declines continuously with the number of assets, from 50% for one asset to only 9.1% for
30 assets. However, for higher levels of correlation, the diversification benefits of multiple
12We note that royalty interests in and of themselves would likely not be qualifying income for the purpose
of the RIC income requirement.
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assets are not as pronounced. For example, with 75% pairwise return correlation, even 100
assets yield only a modest 6.6 percentage-point reduction in volatility.
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Figure 2: Return volatility of a portfolio of n identical assets with pairwise correlations of
0%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 90% for n = 1, . . . , 100.
Therefore, one of the primary objectives of the biomedical BDC portfolio manager is to
select assets that are as uncorrelated—or even negatively correlated—as possible. This ob-
jective seems obvious, particularly from a financial risk/reward perspective, but it flies in the
face of industry practices, due to the highly specialized knowledge required to evaluate and
manage biomedical assets. Managers who develop expertise in one scientific area naturally
seek to make use of that expertise over time, and may not see the value, or have the time and
resources, to develop expertise in several areas simultaneously. From the investor’s perspec-
tive, however, there is considerable value in a simultaneous approach. Hence the biomedical
BDC will have to be organized in parallel teams, each specializing in asset selection within a
relatively narrow field, with an additional “asset allocation” team responsible for balancing
investments across these specializations to optimize the risk/reward characteristics of the
entire portfolio. In this respect, managing a biomedical BDC is not unlike managing a fund
of hedge funds, and Figure 3—adapted from the fund-of-hedge-funds context (Lo, 2010, Ch.
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8)—illustrates how such a process might be organized.
Cash Portfolio Management
Biomedical BDCs differ in one important respect from venture capital and private equity
funds: they receive their investment capital at the time of their equity or debt offering, but
deploy it over time as they identify sufficiently attractive investment opportunities. Unlike a
VC fund that only issues capital calls when the capital is needed, a BDC generally receives
its capital upfront, and must decide how to manage it. If it invests the capital in safe and
liquid assets, such as short-term U.S. government debt, the low yield will be a drag on the
BDC’s overall performance, but if it invests in higher-yielding assets, such as the S&P 500
Index or hedge funds, there is a significant risk of loss due to normal market fluctuations,
and a risk of illiquidity when the capital is needed.
One solution is to strike a balance between these two extremes. By using liquid instru-
ments such as stock-index futures, bond futures, and exchange-traded funds (ETFs), one
can generate market exposure as close as possible to the investment mandate of the BDC,
while managing the overall risk and illiquidity of the cash. For example, a BDC with an
oncology mandate might invest in a diversified portfolio of publicly traded equities in biotech
and pharma companies with cancer therapeutics as their primary business focus. The overall
risk of this portfolio can be managed by using a combination of S&P 500 index futures and
biopharma ETFs13 (e.g., the SPDR S&P Biotech ETF or the iShares NASDAQ Biotech-
nology Index Fund), to either hedge or accentuate the BDC cash portfolio’s exposures to
the biopharma industry. As investment opportunities arise, these positions can be easily
liquidated to free up the required amount of cash.
Although such “overlay” programs are routine in the institutional investment community,
they may not be as familiar to traditional biotech VC investors, and will need to be explained
to them in detail. In particular, it will be important to specify to investors in advance all
of the parameters of an overlay program, so as to be as transparent as possible. Overlays
should not be used to generate significant amounts of investment return for the BDC, but
instead should be seen as a way to manage the BDC’s cash to facilitate and be consistent
with its mission.
13Section 12(d)(1) of the Investment Company Act, among other things, restricts an investment company
from owning more than 3% of another investment company.
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Figure 3: Asset allocation (Stage 1) and asset selection (Stage 2) for a biomedical BDC.
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7 Practical Considerations
VC-BDCs have many benefits for funneling capital to biomedical innovation, most notably in
the creation of permanent capital for long-term research. However, there are also drawbacks
to using VC-BDCs for investing in biomedical innovation, including relatively high operating
costs.
The primary benefit of forming a VC-BDC to fund biomedical innovation is the creation
of permanent capital compared to current venture capital practices. There are a number
of reasons for venture capital’s shortcomings in biomedical innovation. Small capitalization
companies often have longer time periods to IPO than the typical ten-year lifespan of private
VC capital funds (Weild and Kim, 2008). Syndicates of VC investors tend to fracture,
resulting in the inability to raise capital for subsequent rounds of financing, even if the
technology is ultimately successful. Finally, private venture capitalists are often hesitant
to bring VC-backed companies public at earlier stages because internal rates of return are
based on exit values due to provisions in limited partnership agreements that require them to
distribute shares to limited partners at the time of an IPO. An exclusive focus on generating
returns upon an IPO, in order to make distributions to limited partners at the peak of the
company’s valuation, may actually undermine growth of valuation post-IPO.
Unlike private VC firms, VC-BDCs have patient permanent capital. They can more
easily align their interests with biomedical entrepreneurs than private VC firms, thereby
making decisions that create value for the technology. VC-BDCs can tailor their investment
horizons to suit the programs within the portfolio. Accordingly, early-stage research can
be emancipated from financially driven business deadlines, and instead permitted to follow
the most scientifically productive path. This is of particular importance to the life sciences
sector, where untimely interruptions due to financial constraints destroy considerable eco-
nomic value. Even potential financial disruptions can alter the direction of strategic research
during early-stage discovery. Tailoring investment horizons eliminates these effects.
The VC-BDC has the additional benefit of giving the venture capitalist access to retail
investors who are otherwise not permitted to make investments in private funds. Federal
securities laws prohibit retail investors from investing in private equity or VC funds. However,
retail investors are allowed access to this asset class through a VC-BDC.
The VC-BDC has another advantage under federal securities law. Currently, the so-
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called “Volcker Rule” prohibits certain bank investors from investing in certain funds.14
The Volcker Rule is intended to curb risky bank practices, and generally prohibits banking
entities from investing in hedge funds and private equity funds, including venture capital
funds, which are referred to as “covered funds.” However, registered investment companies
and BDCs are specifically excluded from the definition of covered funds, and have seen
renewed interest from banking entities. Since the rule’s release, several banking entities have
filed a registration statement to sponsor BDCs for investing in debt investments.15 It is our
belief that in time, banking entities may elect to sponsor, manage, or invest in VC-BDCs
with objectives similar to private VC funds subject to restriction under the Volcker Rule.
For these investors, the VC-BDC creates liquidity, since it typically trades on a national
stock exchange, unlike an investment in a private fund. Moreover, a VD-BDC has greater
transparency than a private fund, owing to the public filing requirements.
A VC-BDC can raise permanent capital in the public markets, compared with private
VC partnerships that need to separately raise capital for each ten-year fund. VC-BDCs also
have more flexibility in raising capital in the public markets than private equity partnerships,
which generally raise capital in the form of contributions by limited partners. VC-BDCs can
raise capital in a variety of manners, in the form of common stock, preferred stock, notes,
and rights, and by using leverage through credit facilities.
However, there are several drawbacks to using a VC-BDC to invest in biomedical inno-
vation. The primary drawback of BDCs is the expense. Externally managed BDCs have
a high fee structure, and internally managed BDCs have high expenses. Being public is
also expensive. The SEC has estimated that the average cost of achieving initial regulatory
compliance for an IPO is $2.5 million, followed by an ongoing compliance cost, once public,
of $1.5 million per year.16 Companies frequently underestimate the costs associated with
an IPO, which include direct costs, such as underwriter discounts and auditor, legal, and
financial fees, as well as longer-term costs, particularly with respect to compliance (PwC,
2012). BDCs have additional expenses relating to the complicated regulatory regime for
legal and compliance requirements. Finally, because BDCs frequently raise capital in the
public markets, transaction costs with regard to banking fees and transaction expenses are
14Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §619, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010) (“Dodd-Frank” or the “Act”).
15See publicly filed documents for Goldman Sachs BDC, Inc. and Credit Suisse Park View BDC, Inc.
16Proposed Rules: Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66428, 66509 (col. 2) (Nov. 5, 2013).
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significant. VC-BDCs that raise capital in the public markets can have a lower cost of capital
than other forms of financing, but only if enough capital is raised to absorb its operating
expenses.
In addition to being expensive, BDCs are heavily regulated. Because a BDC is a hybrid
of an operating company and an investment company, it is subject to multiple layers of
regulation. BDCs are subject to the compliance rule under the Investment Company Act,
which requires that the BDC adopt policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent
violations of Federal securities laws. BDCs are also subject to compliance with Section 404 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which requires management to document and test internal
controls, and for the auditors to test and report on those controls. Additionally, investment
advisers to externally managed BDCs are subject to the compliance rule under the Advisers
Act, which has requirements similar to the Investment Company Act compliance rule. Like
mutual funds, BDCs must adopt codes of ethics.
Lastly, another challenge of operating a BDC is the difficulty of raising capital by selling
shares below its NAV. As described in Section 5, with the exception of an IPO, a BDC may
not sell common stock at a price below NAV without shareholder approval. While many
debt-BDCs do receive such approval, getting shareholders to agree to such discounts may be
more challenging for a VC-BDC with portfolios of growth stocks.
8 Conclusion
The opportunities for developing novel therapeutics have never been greater, but the chal-
lenges to the biopharma industry are daunting. Because of the increasing complexity, cost,
and duration of drug development, investors are shifting assets toward other investments with
more attractive risk/reward profiles. By creating diversified portfolios of biomedical projects
financed by more patient capital, biopharma entrepreneurs can improve the risk-adjusted
returns of their ventures and tap into new sources of capital such as retail investors, pension
funds, insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds, and other institutional investors.
These innovations are beginning to emerge outside of the United States in jurisdictions
with more flexible capital-market regulations. For example, on March 25, 2015, the Irish
life sciences investment company Malin raised C=330 million in an IPO on the Irish Stock
Exchange to “acquire majority or significant minority equity positions in private, pre IPO,
pre trade sale operating businesses in the life sciences industry” (Reddan, 2015). Three
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months later, PureTech—a U.S.-based biotech startup engine that specializes in creating
and incubating early-stage companies targeting significant unmet medical needs—debuted
on the London Stock Exchange and raised $171 million (Garde, 2015). This may be the
start of a new trend in biomedical investing in which the traditional VC funding model is
replaced by permanent capital raised through public offerings, yielding funds that can then
be deployed more patiently and opportunistically over longer periods of time. The BDC
structure is ideally suited for this purpose.
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Appendix
A Appendix
In this Appendix, we provide more detailed information about various aspects of the BDC
structure, including restrictions on the type of investments BDCs can make, the relationship
it can have to its portfolio investments, the requirements for becoming a RIC for tax purposes,
a comparison between VC- and debt-BDCs, and issues around patents and BDC IP.
A.1 Qualifying Investments
A BDC is required to have at least 70% of its total assets in “qualifying investments,”
which is measured at the time of each new investment. While the Investment Company Act
enumerates several categories of qualifying assets, by and large, most BDCs own securities
that qualify because they have been issued by an “eligible portfolio company.” To be an
eligible portfolio company, an issuer must be organized and have its principal place of business
in the United States, and encompasses all private U.S. companies, as well as U.S. public
companies with an equity market capitalization of up to $250 million.
Investment companies, or companies that would be investment companies but for certain
exceptions set forth in the Investment Company Act, do not count as eligible portfolio com-
panies. In order to be a qualifying asset, the securities must be purchased in transactions
not involving a public offering.
A BDC has discretion to invest in any other investments with the remaining 30% of its
portfolio. BDCs have historically invested in non-qualifying assets that do not fall within the
“70% basket” to provide a source of cash flow to the VC-BDC, which otherwise invests in
securities generating little immediate income. BDCs can also use the 30% basket to diversify
the portfolio, which may contribute to attracting capital from investors.
A.2 Managerial Assistance
A business development company must either control or offer to provide “significant man-
agerial assistance” to portfolio companies that it treats as qualifying assets for the purpose
of the 70% qualifying assets standard. As described in the Investment Company Act, “signif-
icant managerial assistance” means any arrangement whereby a BDC, through its directors,
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officers, employees, or general partners, offer to provide, and if accepted, does provide, “sig-
nificant guidance and counsel concerning the management, operations, or business objectives
and policies of a portfolio company.”
In practice, the managerial assistance that a BDC provides can take many forms, and de-
pends on the particular needs of a portfolio company. In enacting the requirement, Congress
recognized that the assistance provided would vary. Common examples of managerial as-
sistance include assisting portfolio companies in: (1) establishing policies and strategy; (2)
finding directors and management team members; (3) establishing and managing relation-
ships with financing sources; and (4) evaluating acquisition and divestiture opportunities.
In many cases, members of a BDC may attend portfolio company board meetings, or even
hold seats on the board.
Notably, BDCs need only offer such assistance. Whether or not a portfolio company
accepts the offer has no bearing on compliance with the requirement.
A.3 RIC Requirements
Like registered investment companies, BDCs may qualify for treatment as a RIC under
Subchapter M of the Internal Revenue Code for federal income tax purposes. In general, a
RIC is not taxed on its income or gains to the extent it distributes such income or gains to
its shareholders. In order to qualify for favorable RIC tax treatment, BDCs must, in general,
(1) annually derive at least 90% of their gross income from dividends, interest, and gains
from the sale of securities and similar sources (the income test); (2) quarterly meet certain
investment asset diversification requirements; and (3) annually distribute at least 90% of
investment company taxable income as a dividend. Any taxable investment company income
not distributed will be subject to corporate-level tax. Any taxable investment company
income distributed generally will be taxable to shareholders as dividend income.
It should be noted that in the context of making investments in biomedical innovations
which typically have revenue-producing IP through licensing fees, or royalty interests in late-
stage development biopharmaceuticals with royalty payments, these licensing fees and royalty
payments may not be qualifying assets for the purpose of the income test. Accordingly, BDCs
that elect to be treated as RICs typically make investment in corporations in which the IP
is housed so that the “bad income” is not attributable to the RIC.
To satisfy the asset diversification requirements, at the end of each quarter, at least 50%
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of a BDC’s assets must be invested in cash, cash items, U.S. government securities, securities
of other RICs and other securities that, with respect to the BDC, do not represent more
than 5% of value of the BDC’s total assets. Furthermore, a BDC cannot own more than
10% of the voting stock of any one issuer, and cannot invest more than 25% of the value of
its total assets in the securities of any one issuer (other than U.S. government securities and
securities of other RICs), or of two or more issuers that are controlled by the company and
that are engaged in the same or similar trades or businesses, or related trades or businesses.
It should be noted that BDCs set up for biomedical research may qualify for an excep-
tion for the method of calculating the asset diversification tests set forth in Section 851(e)
of the Code in the case of an RIC that furnishes capital to development corporations. This
exception is available only to RICs that have been certified by the SEC (not earlier than 60
days prior to the end of the investment company’s taxable year) “to be principally engaged
in the furnishing of capital to other corporations that are principally engaged in the develop-
ment or exploitation of inventions, technological improvements, new processes, or products
not previously generally available.” After receiving certification from the SEC, the BDC is
subject to a more lenient asset diversification requirement for tax purposes. This exception
would enable a BDC focused on biomedical research to own more than 10% of the voting
interest in biomedical companies, provided that the issuer has not held the investment for
more than 10 years.
A.4 Debt-BDCs versus VC-BDCs
Why are most current BDCs debt-BDCs rather than VC-BDCs? Prior to 2003, most BDCs
were internally managed. BDC activity increased in 2003 after the successful IPOs of two
externally managed BDCs: TICC and AINV (described in more detail below). These IPOs
highlighted the fact that BDCs made it legally possible to charge two performance fees: one
based on capital gains and the other based on income.
In late 2003, TICC Capital Corp. (TICC), formerly Technology Investment Capital
Corp., an externally managed BDC, completed a $130 million IPO. The success of TICC’s
IPO had a significant impact on the financial markets’ perception of an externally managed
BDC (Boehm et al., 2004). Then, Apollo Investment Corporation (AINV) raised $930 million
in less than three months, catching the attention other asset managers. By May 2004, 13
potential IPOs proposing to raise more than $6.7 billion had been filed. All of these new
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BDCs were debt-BDCs.
Since the proliferation of debt-BDCs in the 2000s, the BDC industry has matured from
one that was initially dominated by internally managed funds to an industry of largely yield-
driven vehicles that are externally managed by some of the largest U.S. asset management
platforms. In 2000, there were only seven BDCs, but as of December 31, 2014, there are
more than 70, with more than $51 billion under management. During the two-year period
ended Dec. 31, 2014, traded BDCs collectively raised $9.5 billion in capital, including ap-
proximately $5.5 billion in follow-on equity offerings, $1.8 billion in senior note offerings, and
$1.2 billion in convertible debt offerings, and nine BDCs completed IPOs raising $1 billion.17
The main challenge of forming a VC-BDC to fund biomedical innovation is creating
market demand, owing to the poor historical performance of equity-focused BDCs. There
are several reasons for their poor performance. The most successful BDCs in terms of price-
to-book ratios are those that have high, consistent dividend yields. Investment strategies
more focused on capital gains, such as venture capital investments, have more difficulty
paying a dividend because there is typically no income stream until a portfolio company has
an exit event such as an IPO or acquisition.
Investments in VC-BDCs are long-term growth plays, and have limited to no dividend
distributions in their early stages. For VC-BDCs to become more widely accepted, mar-
ket participants would need to shift their expectations and view equity-focused VC-BDCs
differently than debt-focused BDCs.
Another possibility is that VC-BDCs create innovative investment objectives that in-
clude some sort of dividend yield, quarterly share buy-backs, or the use of the 30% basket to
increase income to either offset the VC-BDCs expenses or pay some sort of dividend distri-
bution. Paying smaller dividends but at an increased pace, such as on a monthly schedule,
may also serve to differentiate VC-BDCs from traditional debt-BDCs.
Another reason for the historical lack of returns for investors in equity-based BDCs is
the absence of re-marketing. While all BDCs are marketed during the IPO, the average
analyst would not have the time or capacity to commit to understanding the multitude of
portfolio companies in an equity-based BDC’s portfolio. Both analysts and retail investors
find it difficult to evaluate a portfolio of a VC-BDC because the portfolio companies are only
17See Dealogic and Prospect News, available at http://www.dealogic.com/login/ and http://
prospectnews.com/.
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valued quarterly, and are not marked to market on a daily basis. Additionally, in the context
of funding biomedical innovation, the analysts would need specialized scientific expertise to
understand the technologies. Therefore, particular effort must be made to determine the
best plan of action for the re-marketing of a VC-BDC post-IPO.
Despite these obstacles, there have been signs of a resurgence of VC-BDCs focused on
making equity investments. In addition to Harris & Harris Group (1995) and MVC Capital
(1999)—both of which have been operating as VC-BDCs for quite some time—newer VC-
BDCs include Firsthand Technology (2010) and GSV Capital (2011). The pace at which
the VC-BDC industry grows in the future will depend on the performance of the existing
VC-BDCs, the strength of the overall market, and a change in the perception of VC-BDCs
that are inappropriately compared with debt-BDCs.
A.5 Patents
Although a scientific discovery may be groundbreaking, the receptiveness of the business
community to its further development will hinge on different criteria. The ultimate prof-
itability of scientific research depends on the ability to carve out a monopoly in that space,
in order to make that research profitable. That monopoly is granted in the form of a patent.
In order to be granted a patent, an invention must meet three criteria: it must be (1)
new; (2) non-obvious; and (3) have utility. In order to be valid, the invention must represent
something new, over and above the entire knowledge base in a particular area of research
(“prior art”), including published papers, products, and other patents. It must not be
obvious from that prior art, but should present an “innovative step” above that body of
work. Finally, a patent is not an abstract idea, like a formula. It must be reduced to an
invention or something practical in order to qualify for a patent.
The ultimate patent application will disclose the invention to a sufficient degree to enable
any third party to read it and recreate the invention without assistance. The patent appli-
cation will also define the scope of the invention in the claims of the application, which will
describe the idea the entrepreneur seeks to protect. Intellectual property expertise should
be sought throughout this process.
There is one important mistake that entrepreneurs can make in the patent application
process, which may not be readily apparent: the premature disclosure of the invention. The
patent monopoly is granted to an inventor in order to make valuable inventions available for
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public use at the end of a patent term. However, if the invention has already been disclosed
in a published paper or at a conference more than 12 months prior to a patent filing, this
defeats the purpose of a patent monopoly. It is important that inventors do not undermine
the ultimate commercial viability of their research by prematurely disclosing it. Venture
capitalists and investors prefer to see that adequate mechanisms are in place to protect
against disclosure, such as non-disclosure agreements (NDAs). These can be discussed with
legal counsel.
Venture capitalists, regardless of whether they structure themselves as private partner-
ships or VC-BDCs, also prefer that steps have been taken toward the ultimate commercial-
ization of an entrepreneur’s research. In the biomedical sector, this generally means that
steps have been taken towards the prosecution of a patent. A patent provides entrepreneurs
with several tools in their arsenal. As long as an entrepreneur is practicing within the claims
specified in the patent filing, he or she is in a better position to protect him or herself in
the event of litigation. Patents can also be used offensively to exclude competitors from
practicing an entrepreneur’s invention, as specified in the claims of the filing.
Investors like patents for several reasons. First, a patent provides investors with some
reassurance that the entrepreneur’s research has identified something new. Second, it signals
that the entrepreneur has the ability to exclude other competitors from the market, thus
rendering the research more lucrative, and signaling that the entrepreneur will not be solely
relying on the investors in order to get their product to market first. Third, the granting of
a patent implies that certain hurdles have been overcome, which makes future obstacles to
the commercialization of the research less likely. Fourth and finally, particularly in a risky
sector, a patent reassures investors that the entrepreneur has some assets to fall back on if
the business plan ultimately falls short of its envisioned commercial path.
Entrepreneurs can strengthen their bargaining positions by taking manageable steps to-
wards the above process before approaching venture capitalists. There are three main qual-
ities that venture capitalists look for in early-stage investment opportunities from an IP
perspective: (1) freedom to operate; (2) ability to exclude others; and (3) evaluation of third
party agreements.
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A.6 Freedom to Operate
A new biomedical enterprise cannot normally afford litigation. Patent lawsuits cost about
$500,000 per claim if brought to trial.18 “Freedom to operate” (FTO) is the ability to
produce and sell the biomedical research, without infringing another patent. Investors will
seek reassurances that no such “blocking patents” exist, or that, if they do, an entrepreneur
has adequate license rights to capture the anticipated body of work, and preclude the viability
of any such lawsuit. These license rights commonly come from a variety of institutions. (VC-
BDCs commonly work with entrepreneurs to evaluate and secure the necessary license rights
through an option agreement or a license agreement.)
To increase their value in the eyes of investors, entrepreneurs may wish to conduct prelim-
inary patent searches, obtain relevant licenses, or obtain an FTO opinion from legal counsel.
An FTO opinion identifies any patents that will block or severely limit the company’s ability
to market a product, or establish a dominant patent position. This assures investors of the
entrepreneur’s ability to function in the marketplace in view of the patent rights of others.
A.7 Ability to Exclude Others
Investors look for entrepreneurs with an ability to exclude competitors from the market.
While a patent prevents someone other than a patent owner from making, using, selling, or
offering to sell what is covered by the claims of a patent application, the precise wording
of those claims may affect the extent to which a patent will confer a concurrent ability to
exclude others, thus increasing the chances of a costly infringement lawsuit. In this regard, it
is important to seek the opinion of qualified legal counsel, who can assist entrepreneurs with
their IP strategy. A robust offensive and defensive IP strategy aligned with a business plan
can stymie infringement suits, as well as amass a proactive IP portfolio that can be licensed
out in order to generate additional revenue, and thus render the company more valuable to
investors (Braidwood and Ertel, 2005).
A.8 Evaluation of Third Party Agreements
Finally, investors will seek assurances that there are no encumbrances on their ability to
generate a sufficient return on their investment. These encumbrances are most often found in
18See World Intellectual Property Organization, available at http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/
venture_capital_investments_fulltext.html.
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the entrepreneur’s existing contracts with third parties, including, but not limited to: license
agreements for background IP, which may establish restrictive boundaries surrounding an
application or “field of use” of the research; or employment contracts with staff, which may
fail to include “non-disclosure” or “assignment” provisions ensuring that all ideas, inventions,
and discoveries developed within the scope of employment flow through to the company.19
These provisions may transfer IP rights under terms that dramatically affect investors’
ability to make a return on their investment, and must therefore be thoroughly canvassed by
IP counsel. In the biomedical sector, where university professors or graduate students often
first develop key technology, agreements should be studied to ensure a university cannot
assert its rights to the IP, or that government actors cannot practice the invention without
compensation. In drug discovery and development, where small companies commonly have
pre-existing collaborations with larger companies, it becomes important to examine contrac-
tual rights.20 In order to increase their value to investors, entrepreneurs may seek a legal
opinion assuring investors that the path to commercialization is clear, prior to delivering
their pitch.
In sum, venture capitalists, including VC-BDCs, are ultimately seeking assurances that
their chosen investment is a sound one. This is determined on the basis of the entrepreneur’s
legal and IP rights. By assembling some or all of the above pieces into a coherent IP
strategy in line with their business objectives, entrepreneurs can make the investment process
significantly easier. Conducting advance due diligence with an IP attorney can clarify and
streamline an entrepreneur’s objectives, as well as to conduct an inventory of IP assets and
documents for inspection, which may speed up investors’ due diligence process and close a
deal more quickly.
19See http://www.buildingipvalue.com/n_us/97_101.htm.
20This list is by no means exhaustive, and will be further explored in a forthcoming publication.
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